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Abstract 
This paper tests two predictions implied by models of the common-pool game in 
federations where subnational governments are more likely to have higher deficits because 
they do not internalize the macroeconomic effects of fiscal profligacy. The first is that 
subnational governments that belong to the same political party as the central government 
have lower spending and deficits because they are more likely to be influenced to 
internalize the macroeconomic effects of additional local spending; and the second is that 
subnational governments that are more dependent on intergovernmental transfers have 
higher spending and deficits. We find that in 15 major states of India over the period 1972-
1995, states in fact have substantially higher spending and deficits (higher by about 10 
percent of the sample average) when their government belongs to the same party as that 
governing at the center; and that intergovernmental grants tend to have a counter-intuitive 
negative effect on spending and deficits. The additional deficit of affiliated states is 
financed almost entirely by additional loans from the central government (as opposed to 
the market) leading to our interpretation that similar political considerations influence the 
distribution of deficits across states as they do other intergovernmental grants. We argue 
that the evidence from India, contrasted with broader international evidence, indicates that 
the effect of fiscal institutions in a federation is sensitive to underlying political incentives. 
This underscores the overall importance of political institutions in determining the 
consolidated government deficit, relative to specific rules of intergovernmental transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
There is increasing concern in policy circles that developing countries that are rapidly 
decentralizing are exposed to the risk of macroeconomic instability due to growing fiscal 
deficits and soft budget constraints at subnational levels. While similar concerns exist for 
developed countries as well, the risk is perceived as exacerbated for developing countries 
because of lower potential revenue bases at local levels, higher dependence on federal 
transfers, and poor quality of legal institutions. The concern gains credence largely from 
individual case studies of sizable and persistent subnational deficits in federal countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, and India (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2001, World Bank 1999) and the 
theoretical and intuitive link between fiscal deficits and decentralization. 
This link lies in a political economy perspective of fiscal federalism in which the 
geographical distribution of costs, benefits, and decisionmaking power over public 
expenditures leads to a “common pool” problem akin to the classic theory of distributive 
politics (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981, Inman and Fitts 1990, Aizenman 1998). If 
subnational governments make spending decisions, and are financed by transfers from the 
national government, which raises taxes, then the resulting amount of total government 
spending will be inefficient, because local authorities do not fully internalize the effects of 
their spending decisions on the consolidated government budget.  
Within this framework, variations in political and institutional relations between the 
national and different subnational governments will have differential effects on the common 
pool problem, and hence on individual subnational fiscal policies. Jones, Sanguinetti, and 
Tommasi (2000) develop two hypotheses based on the common pool game for the impact of 
federal-provincial relations on spending by provincia l governments in Argentina—one, 
provinces with higher federal transfers will have higher spending; and two, provinces where 
the governor is from the same party as the President will have lower spending. The first 
hypothesis is argued to result from the greater de-coupling of tax and spending decisions in 
provinces that are more favored by federal transfers. The second hypothesis follows the 
argument that the provincial governor who is politically affiliated with the national President 
will be more likely to internalize the effect of spending an additional unit of national 
resources due to internal party discipline. The empirical evidence from the Argentine 
provinces is consistent with both hypotheses. Similar evidence for the impact of 
intergovernmental transfers has been found for German provinces (Rodden 2000), the U.S. 
states (Rogers and Rogers 2000) and in cross-country analysis (Rodden 2002). This paper 
estimates the effect of political and fiscal relations between the national and provincial 
governments on provincial fiscal deficits in another large federation of the developing world, 
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India, to examine whether the above implications of the common pool problem holds under an 
arguably different model of federal politics. 
Ter-Minassian (1997), Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack (2001) and Inman (2001) study 
the mechanisms and institutions that support fiscal discipline, or indiscipline, at the 
subnational level. The underlying story is essentially one of errant local governments yielding 
to the temptation of shifting their own budgetary costs onto the central government. Fiscal 
profligacy by subnational governments is (unwillingly) rewarded by the national government 
as it is unable to commit in advance to a policy of “no bailouts” when a local jurisdiction is in 
trouble. Specific deficit bailouts and general federal transfers both “soften” the local 
government’s budget constraint and lead to inefficient resource allocation (Inman 2001). The 
national government is thus vulnerable to strategic manipulation by local governments 
because of its inability to commit to a “no-bailout” policy. 
The above story of a center vulnerable to subnational fiscal profligacy is based upon 
models of electoral competition where the national government is elected from national 
constituencies and evaluated on the basis of macroeconomic outcomes. Thus, the national 
government has more powerful incentives for fiscal conservatism than each subnational 
government. In this model, greater fiscal decentralization would be associated with higher 
deficits, other things being equal (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). An implication of 
this model tested by Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tomassi (2000), as indicated above, is that 
subnational governments that are politically affiliated with the center will be less likely to 
engage in opportunistic behavior, and should have lower deficits. 
Institutions of fiscal decentralization may assist in providing perverse incentives for 
subnational expenditures by increasing the disconnect between tax and spending decisions. 
Specifically, when subnational governments are largely dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers rather than locally generated revenues, and where transfers are designed to assist 
fiscally disadvantaged states, the fiscal institutions may facilitate over-borrowing and over-
spending by subnational governments because the central government finds it harder to 
commit to a “no-bailout” policy (Rodden 2002). Indian fiscal federalism is indeed 
characterized by vertical fiscal imbalance, where the states have undertaken 50-60 percent of 
total government spending in the last decade, of which 30-40 percent has been financed by 
central transfers (Rao and Singh 2000). Intergovernmental transfers in India have also long 
been assumed to provide perverse incentives to state governments because of the so-called 
“gap-filling” approach where some transfers are directed to cover the discrepancy between 
planned expenditures and expected revenues (Rao 1998, McCarten 2001). 
In this paper we use variation in party affiliation and intergovernmental grants across 
15 major states of India over a 24-year period from 1972-95 to test the above implications. 
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Contrary to the expectations outlined above we find that in periods when a state government 
belongs to the same party as that at the center the state has higher than average fiscal deficits, 
and greater transfers are correlated with lower spending and lower deficits. The partisan effect 
is large, with deficits in affiliated states being 10 percent higher on average than deficits in 
non-affiliated states. Additional evidence indicates that among affiliated states, deficits are 
greater in those states where the ruling party controls a smaller proportion of seats to the 
national legislature, and thus states which may be politically pivotal to gain a majority in the 
national legislature. 
We argue that this evidence is consistent with a particular model of federal politics 
that exists in India, consisting of electoral competition amongst different political parties 
where voters are responsive to local public spending and tend to vote along party lines. We 
find that the higher deficits of affiliated states is entirely financed by greater loans from the 
central government, as opposed to other forms of market debt, and interpret this as evidence 
that similar political considerations drive the distribution of deficits across subnational 
governments as they do other intergovernmental grants. This political effect on deficits is 
consistent with recent evidence on the political determinants of systematic channels of 
intergovernmental transfers to the states in India (Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta 2001, 
Khemani 2002, and Rao and Singh 2000).  
The contrast of the Indian experience versus other international evidence suggests that 
the effect of institutions of fiscal decentralization on subnational spending and deficits is 
dependent on the nature of the political incentive environment. This analysis thus provides a 
rationale to somewhat dissociate the problem of subnational fiscal deficits from the 
institutions of fiscal decentralization (such as rules of intergovernment fiscal transfers), and 
renew focus on general political determinants of deficits, or on institutions of political 
decentralization. We develop a simple model where the counter-intuitive effects of political 
partisanship and intergovernment transfers on subnational deficits in India can exist in 
equilibrium under specific electoral institutions and voting behavior. The empirical evidence 
provided here may motivate the development of a more general theory, and subsequent cross-
country empirical testing, of the sensitivity of the impact of fiscal decentralization instruments 
to variation in federal political institutions around the world.  
There exists a substantial macroeconomic literature on the political and institutional 
determinants of fiscal deficits of the national government (see Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1996 
for excellent surveys and von Hagen, 1992). Some of this political and institutional analysis 
carries over to the case of subnational governments, with a political game played within 
subnational governments between different agents, in addition to any federal game. Poterba 
(1994) and Alt and Lowry (1994) examine the effect of divided governments on fiscal policy 
in the American states, and find that adjustment to fiscal shocks is slower in states with 
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different parties controlling the state legislature and executive. Poterba (1996) provides a 
survey of the impact of legislated budgetary institutions on state fiscal policy—states with 
balanced budget rules adjust faster to fiscal shocks. However, this strand of literature on 
budget deficits did not study the impact of broader political and constitutional institutions like 
electoral rules and political regimes. 
The empirical evidence for the Indian states shows that political institutions governing 
relations between the central and state governments is a significant determinant of subnational 
deficits, and provides additional motivation for delving deeper into the political incentives 
driving budget deficits in a federation. Partisan affiliation between the central and state 
governments in fact stands out as the only significant political determinant of subnational 
deficits, to the exclusion of other plausible political and institutional determinants that have 
been tested in the received literature, such as election cycles, fragmented legislatures, and 
budgetary institutions.  
In the next section we lay out a theoretical framework for the impact of federal 
political institutions on subnational deficits, that motivates our empirical specification and 
interpretation of the evidence. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data, 
and presents the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Analytical framework 
Variation in subnational deficits and spending, after controlling for basic economic 
conditions that are fundamental determinants of deficits, can be thought of as the result of 
strategic interaction between central and subnational governments. We adopt this approach 
here and develop a simple game theoretic framework to examine the role of federal political 
relations and intergovernmental transfers in determining subnational deficits. The basic 
analytical framework used here is drawn from Inman’s (2001) characterization of fiscal 
bargaining between local and national governments. Ultimately, the relative significance of 
political affiliation and intergovernmental transfers in determining subnational deficits is an 
empirical question, and the primary focus of this study.  
Figure 1 lays out the sequential game between the provincial and central government. 
The “status-quo” of this game is the outcome of the central government’s determination of 
overall resource allocation to the provincial governments to optimize its political objectives. 
The provincial government deficit is determined at the nationally optimal level ( d ), which is 
fully funded by the central government through loans ( l ). However, the provincial 
government, as the first mover in this game, can undertake an action of over-spending and 
increasing its deficit ( dD ) beyond the optimal level that is financed systematically by central 
loans. The central government may respond to this additional deficit by either financing it 
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through additional loans ( lD ) or leaving the local government to fund its additional deficit 
through fiscal retrenchment, raising additional taxes or lowering spending. The payoffs to the 
central and provincial governments may be expressed as the difference between benefits and 
costs for each pair of actions undertaken.  
 
  Figure 1. 
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government cannot credibly commit in advance to a “no-bailout” policy. The argument is 
usually along the following lines: voters distinguish between the role of provincial and central 
governments, holding the former responsible for the provision of local public goods and the 
latter for general macroeconomic stability and insurance from unexpected shocks. However, 
they are unable to perfectly distinguish whether fiscal problems and economic hardships are 
due to unsustainable actions taken by the provincial government or inaction by the central 
government during times of negative economic shocks. Hence, in the event of local fiscal 
indiscipline the central government is not likely to withhold a bailout because that would be 
politically costly. Knowing this, local governments have incentives to over-spend. By this 
same argument, within countries provinces that are more dependent on central transfers would 
be more likely to have higher spending and deficits. 
Within countries the conditions for this equilibrium are also more likely to hold the 
greater is the political bargaining power of a provincial government, leading to a correlation 
between the level of provincial deficits and spending and indicators of provincial bargaining 
power. Hence, large provincial governments with a large vote-base or provinces with a pivotal 
vote-base are more likely to receive additional central funds to finance additional spending. 
Furthermore, large provinces with significant fiscal externalities for the rest of the country 
may be “too big to fail” and also likely to have higher spending and deficits financed by 
central loans.  
The main question of interest for our purposes here is that controlling for size and 
political representation, how does spending and deficits vary across provinces with different 
political affiliations and varying degrees of dependence on intergovernmental transfers? 
Variation in political affiliation across provinces could be correlated with variation in 
provincial deficits because of the role affiliation plays in the central determination of (d, l), 
and not as a result of strategic fiscal bargaining between central and provincial governments. 
Khemani (2002) develops a model of central resource allocation where the solution is 
characterized by greater central transfers to politically affiliated states because the center 
gains political advantage in these states. Central loans, or central guarantees of market loans, 
are instruments of resource transfer which would thus also favor affiliated states according to 
the model, implying higher (d, l) for affiliated as opposed to unaffiliated states.  
In this section we focus on the conditions under which fiscal bargaining between the 
center and provinces may lead to higher subnational deficits. We outline a model of political 
relations in a federation to generate payoff functions for the center-province game described 
above and examine the conditions under which ( dD , lD ) would be an equilibrium, leading to 
variation in deficits across provinces as a result of different conditions of center-province 
bargaining.  
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We model federal politics as electoral competition between rival political parties with 
representation in both central and provincial governments.1 Political parties A and B compete 
for seats to the national and state legislatures, and the party with a majority of seats at each 
level gets to form the executive government at that level. Each province is divided into 
electoral districts for both the state and the national legislature. Voters hold the provincial 
governments responsible for providing local public goods and the central government 
responsible for macroeconomic stability and insurance against regional economic shocks. 
Good (bad) performance of provincial governments leads to positive (negative) spillovers for 
the political party even at the national level. Conversely, performance of a political party at 
the national level has spillover effects in provincial elections. The objective of political parties 
at each tier of government is to maximize representation in the elected legislature.2  
Without loss of generality, let party A be the incumbent party at the federal 
government with majority seats in the national legislature. Among the provinces in the 
federation, a subset AÂ  have incumbents belonging to the party A and are affiliated with the 
center, whereas the remaining subset BÂ  have incumbents belonging to the party B and are 
therefore unaffiliated with the center.  
Let caS and 
c
uS  denote the number of seats the central government wins on average in 
affiliated and unaffiliated provinces, and let paS  and 
p
uS  denote the typical number of seats 
the provincial governments win. The objective of each tier of government is to maximize the 
number of seats in the legislature, and the payoff functions are therefore in terms of gains and 
losses in electoral districts. Hence, we have the “status quo” payoffs for affiliated states, AÂ , 
as follows: 
c
a
c SQ =        (4a) 
p
a
p SQ =        (4b) 
                                                 
1 Treisman (1999) models political decentralization as the interaction between central and local officials in 
a two-level state, where local officials have the power to accept or reject the center’s authority, while the center 
has coercive capacity to enforce its authority through the use of sanctions. Increasing decentralization in this 
model is characterized as a reduction in the stock of punishments available to the center to enforce its authority. 
In this model, the strategic game between the center and the provinces restricts the ability of the center to use 
instruments of economic reform for fiscal and macroeconomic stability. 
2 In most models of distribution of national resources the objective function is assumed to be the 
maximization of vote share or vote total, as political parties arguably care about their margin of victory or about 
having a strong minority presence (Dixit and Londregan 1995, 1996, 1998 and Cox and McCubbins 1986). 
Snyder (1989) however shows that different empirical predictions for district-level resource allocation are 
obtained if the objective is to maximize the number of seats won or the probability of winning a majority of 
seats. Since the analysis undertaken here is at a level of aggregation above the district, we abstract from these 
finer details in the nature of the political objective function. 
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and for unaffiliated states, BÂ , as; 
c
u
c SQ =       (5a) 
p
u
p SQ =       (5b) 
Increasing public expenditures allow incumbent political parties to gain additional 
districts in elections at all levels by extending political patronage to critical coalitions of 
voters in return for general support for the party. Hence, if an affiliated province in AÂ  
undertakes additional spending ( dD ), and the center responds by providing the necessary 
funds ( lD ), then the political party A controlling both the center and the province gains some 
seats from that province’s electorate through the provision of local public goods. Let cud  and 
p
ud  be the additional seats that may be gained for the central and provincial governments in 
AÂ  if the provincial government over-spends and the central government funds the additional 
deficit.  
If party B undertakes additional spending in a provincial government in BÂ  that is 
fully financed by the center, then it gains seats in both the provincial and national legislature, 
leading to a loss of seats from that province for party A in the national legislature. Therefore, 
in unaffiliated states in BÂ , let 
p
ud  be the additional seats gained by the provincial 
government with over-spending, and let cud  be the loss of seats for the central government in 
the national legislature should it bail-out its rival political party.  
Therefore, we have:  
0³cad  and 0³
p
ad       (6a) 
0£cud  and 0³
p
ud      (6b) 
Political party A also incurs costs of macroeconomic instability by extending 
additional loans, above the nationally optimal level l, which reduces the well-being of the 
average voter. Let ce  and pe  be the cost incurred by party A in any province in the central 
and provincial legislatures respectively whenever it undertakes action lD .  
Therefore, we have: 
0£ce , 0£pe      (7) 
If a provincial government undertakes additional spending which is subsequently not 
financed by the center, and requires fiscal retrenchment, its party loses credibility and 
goodwill with the voters. In addition, since voters cannot perfectly distinguish between fiscal 
irresponsibility of provincial governments and inaction on the part of a central government 
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that is responsible for insuring the regions against negative economic shocks, each time 
unexpected fiscal retrenchment occurs, voters also punish the party in power at the center. If a 
province in AÂ , takes action dD , and the center responds with l , then party A loses 
c
am  in 
the central legislature and pam  in the provincial legislature. Conversely, if a province in BÂ , 
takes action dD , and the center responds with l , then party B loses pum  in the provincial 
legislature. Party A stands to gain some seats in the national legislature because of the loss of 
support for party B, but also to lose some seats because of voter perception of poor 
performance in providing regional insurance. Let cum  be the net change in seats for party A in 
the central legislature. 
Therefore, we have:  
0<cam  and 0<
p
am      (8a) 
c
um ? ?0 and 0<pum      (8b) 
In addition, the loss to the central government because of a provincial government’s 
fiscal retrenchment will be greater the greater is the dependence of the provincial government 
on intergovernmental transfers. With greater dependence on central transfers provincial voters 
are more likely to hold the central government responsible for their region’s well-being, and 
therefore more likely to punish the center for perceived fiscal mismanagement in their region. 
Hence, we have: 
0
||
>
dT
d iam , for pci ,= , for 
0<
dT
d cum , if 0>cum  
0
||
>
dT
d cum , if 0<cum  
where T = central transfers. 
The payoff functions in a center-province game in AÂ are therefore: 
c
l
c
l CB DD -  = ][
cc
a
c
aS ed ++    (9a) 
c
l
c
l CB -  = 
c
a
c
aS m+     (9b) 
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p
l
p
l CB DD -  = ][
pp
a
p
aS ed ++    (9c) 
p
l
p
l CB -  = 
p
a
p
aS m+     (9d) 
whereas the payoff functions in a center-province game in BÂ are the following:  
c
l
c
l CB DD -  = ][
cc
u
c
uS ed ++    (10a) 
c
l
c
l CB -  = 
c
u
c
uS m+     (10b) 
p
l
p
l CB DD -  = 
p
u
p
uS d+     (10c) 
p
l
p
l CB -  = 
p
u
p
uS m+     (10d) 
From our assumptions above, the payoff functions from the center-province game in 
AÂ  and in BÂ are independent. Hence, the conditions of equilibrium for the overall game 
between the center and the two types of provinces in AÂ  and BÂ  are the same as the 
equilibrium conditions for isolated center-province games.  
For the central government to provide additional loans to affiliated states in 
equilibrium, we must have the following conditions satisfied: 
>cad ||
c
a
c me -       (11) 
0>+ ppa ed       (12) 
Condition (11) implies that the gain in seats for the central government due to 
additional public expenditures by its affiliated political party has to be greater than the 
absolute difference between the loss in seats due to the costs of macroeconomic instability 
and the loss in seats due to fiscal retrenchment of the provincial government. Hence, even if 
the gain in seats due to additional local expenditures is less than the loss in seats due to 
suboptimal levels of borrowing, >cad ||
ce , so that the center prefers the status quo ( ca
c SQ = ) 
3, the center may still be forced to bail-out the provincial government if the loss from 
provincial fiscal retrenchment ( cam ) is high enough (in absolute value). Condition (12) simply 
states that the provincial government must prefer the outcome with fully funded additional 
spending than the status quo. 
                                                 
3 This is what we would expect if (d, l) is defined as the centrally determined optimal level of subnational 
deficits and central loans, given initial economic and political conditions. 
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For the central government to provide additional loans to unaffiliated states in 
equilibrium, the following conditions must be satisfied: 
 
0<cum      (13) 
|| cum > ||
cc
u ed +       (14) 
Condition (13) needs to be satisfied at a minimum because otherwise we would 
have cl
c
l CB -  >
c
l
c
l CB DD - , following from (6b) and (7). That is, for ( dD , lD ) to be an 
equilibrium in unaffiliated states, the gain to the central political party from its rival party’s 
discomfiture due to fiscal retrenchment has to be less than the direct loss to the central party 
due to perceived mismanagement of central transfers. Condition (14) follows from (13) and 
implies that the loss to the central government in seats from the province’s electorate must be 
greater than the loss in seats due to a bail-out—both directly because of adverse 
macroeconomic impacts and indirectly because of the gain in popularity of the rival political 
party. 
All of conditions (11)-(14) are more likely to be satisfied when provincial 
governments are highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers from the center leading to 
large values (in the absolute) for ijm , where i = c, p and j = a, u. In this case, greater 
dependence on central transfers may be driving the variation in subnational deficits, as 
provinces with greater dependence, irrespective of political affiliation, are likely to exact 
higher political costs on the central government if they are forced to make costly fiscal 
adjustments. Political affiliation may not account for any of the variation in subnational 
deficits due to fiscal bargaining. 
On the other hand, if provincial voters tend to be very responsive to public 
expenditures by local governments, and less likely to punish the central government for 
regional fiscal mismanagement, then conditions (11) and (12) are more likely to hold than 
conditions (13) and (14). Condition (13) would tend to fail as the central party would be more 
likely to make a net gain from voter dissatisfaction with the rival party in the province as the 
latter is forced to make spending cut-backs. Condition (11) is more likely to be satisfied than 
condition (14) because it requires a smaller value of || cum  for j = a, u. In this case, we would 
find politically affiliated provinces with higher deficits than unaffiliated provinces because of 
the greater political bargaining power of affiliated provinces. 
The assumptions of the above model are consistent with the received analysis of 
federal politics in India. India is a parliamentary democracy since the adoption of its 
constitution in 1950, with direct elections based on universal adult suffrage to the Lok Sabha, 
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or the House of the People, the lower house at the national level, and to the Vidhan Sabhas, 
the individual legislative assemblies at the state level. The political party with majority seats 
in the national legislature forms the cabinet of ministers and appoints the Prime Minister to 
lead the executive branch of the national government. Analogous to the national executive, 
the state executive consists of a cabinet of ministers headed by a Chief Minister and appointed 
by the majority party in the Vidhan Sabha. 
Voters in India are known to vote overwhelmingly along party lines, across state and 
national elections (Butler, Lahiri, and Roy 1995). Chhibber (1995) and Weiner and Field 
(1974) suggest that there are limited ideological differences between parties along the lines of 
economic policy, but rather, party identity is driven by social, ethnic, and regional differences. 
Electoral competition between these parties has been characterized as revolving around access 
to the instruments of government and appropriation of public resources by different groups 
(Chhibber 1995).  
Expenditure responsibilities in the Indian federation are largely decentralized to state 
governments who thus have access to spending instruments with direct impact on people’s 
lives. If a party loses control of a state government it thus loses control over some public 
instruments to buy political support through patronage. Hence, it is not surprising to note that 
if a party comes to power in a state (by winning a majority of seats in the state legislature), 
then in the next national elections that party also tends to win seats to the national legislature 
from that state.4 Hence, additional spending by state governments can be expected to yield 
benefits in the form of additional seats for the political party in power in the state, in both 
state and national elections.  
Specific electoral institutions in India may also make it more likely that the central 
government stands to gain more through augmented local expenditure programs than to lose 
from the overall macroeconomic effects of over-spending and over-borrowing. India’s first-
past-the-post voting system is based on contests between individual candidates in single-
member constituencies where the seat is won by the candidate that gets more votes than any 
other. This simple plurality electoral law in practice implies a very tenuous link between the 
percentage of popular votes received by a party and the probability of winning the majority of 
seats in the legislature, because of fragmented electoral competition in each constituency. 
Butler, Lahiri, and Roy (1995) indicate that once a party crosses a particular threshold in 
                                                 
4 An example from the state of Andhra Pradesh is illustrative in this context. The Congress party lost 
control of the state government in Andhra Pradesh in the 1983 state elections to a new regional party, the Telegu 
Desam. In the next national elections in 1984, even though it won an overwhelming majority of seats in the 
national legislature, the Congress lost most seats from Andhra Pradesh to the Telegu Desam, despite the latter’s 
novice status in national politics.  
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votes, around 30 to 35 percent, it can move to a landslide victory in seats by gaining just a few 
percentage points in popular support. In many electoral districts it is possible for a candidate 
to win with just about 20 percent of the popular vote (Butler, Lahiri, and Roy 1995).  
At the end of the day, it is really the number of seats in the legislature that matters for 
political control, so interest group politics to attain the critical number of votes from a large 
number of constituencies may be the key political strategy for all parties. Getting the critical 
number of votes to win a district may therefore be easier to accomplish with a strategy of 
targeted public expenditures towards pivotal coalitions of voters, and the cost of undertaking 
non-optimal levels of spending may be too diffuse across voters to translate into a substantial 
loss in electoral districts. 
The relative importance of intergovernmental transfers and federal political 
institutions in explaining variation in subnational deficits is ultimately an empirical question. 
In the following section we lay out the empirical specification suggested by the analytical 
framework presented here, and test for the significance of political affiliation and central 
transfers in determining subnational deficits. 
3. Data, empirical specification, and results 
Data 
The data set for this study is compiled from diverse sources for 15 major states of 
India over the period 1972-95. The political data is compiled from Butler, Lahiri, and Roy 
(1995). The public finance data on revenues, expenditures, and intergovernment transfers, is 
available from relevant volumes of the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, a quarterly publication 
of the central bank of India with annual issues on details of finances of state governments.5 
State demographic and economic characteristics, and a state- level price index to convert all 
variables into real terms are available from an Indian data set put together at the World Bank. 
A detailed description of these variables is available in Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for each of the variables included in the analysis.  
 
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Tim Besley of the London School of Economics and to Bhaskar Naidu of the World 
Bank’s South Asia regional division for providing me with some of this data that had already been compiled in 
their research groups. 
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Table 1. Summary Statisticsa 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same political 
party) 
360 0.62 0.49 
Affiliation * Seats 360 0.47 0.41 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats 360 0.15 0.26 
Coalition government 
(=1 if state executive consists of a coalition govt.) 360 0.16 0.37 
State election year 
(=1 in the year preceding a state election) 360 0.21 0.41 
Real state income  360 4803.73 1807.98 
Total population (in thousands) 360 47396.79 28163.28 
Real fiscal deficitb 360 193.41 118.62 
Loans from the market (net) 360 31.73 40.19 
Loans from the central government (net) 360 105.13 94.17 
Planning Commission Grants 348 55.41 48.45 
Finance Commission Transfers 352 173.32 64.80 
Loans by the state government (net) 360 67.66 66.67 
Spending (net of interest payments and loans) 360 843.95 364.71 
Revenues 360 813.10 349.95 
Growth 360 3.32 10.25 
a. Fiscal variables and state income are in per capita 1992 rupees 
b. Fiscal Deficit = Total current expenditure + total capital expenditure – total revenue + (loans by state 
government – recovery of loans). 
These 15 states of India account for 95 percent of the total population. India consists 
of 26 states at present but many of the smaller ones have been created recently. However, 11 
of the 15 states under study have existed since the organization of the federation in 1956. An 
additional two, were created for linguistic reasons out of a single large state—Maharashtra 
and Gujarat—in 1960; and two in 1966—Pubjab and Haryana—also for ethnic and linguistic 
reasons. Hence, in order to avoid issues of endogenous state boundaries, and of special 
transfers to some smaller states, we focus only on the 15 major states that have existed from 
the early days of the federation. 6 
Specification 
The primary objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of intergovernmental 
grants and political affiliation between the center and a state government on the latter’s fiscal 
deficit. The analytical framework developed in section 2 suggests that the effect of political 
affiliation and intergovernmental transfers should be estimated after controlling for general 
economic factors and other measures of political bargaining that affect the nationally optimal 
                                                 
6 These 15 states are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. A sixteenth 
major state, Jammu and Kashmir, has been excluded because of the political uncertainties in the region that 
continue to this day. 
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level d of subnational deficits. We begin with the simplest specification for the effect of 
political affiliation:  
DEFICITit = b AFFILIATIONit + h Zit + ai + d t + e it  (1) 
where DEFICITit is the fiscal deficit in state i in year t; AFFILIATIONit is an indicator of 
political affiliation that equals 1 when the governing party in state i at time t belongs to the 
same party as that governing at the center at time t, and 0 otherwise.7 Time variant economic 
and demographic characteristics of states (state domestic product and total population) are 
included in the vector Zit, while ai controls for state- level fixed effects, including the overall 
political importance of the state in the national legislature. In addition, a time effect for each 
year, d t, is included to control for various shocks to the state economy in any given year. 
These additional variables need to be included because they are likely to be correlated with 
unobservable voter tastes and other shocks that affect both the political process of determining 
affiliation of the state government as well as fiscal deficits. Hence, b , the coefficient on 
political affiliation, is identified from variation within a state from its own average deficit 
when it is affiliated and not affiliated with the center. Under the hypothesis that the central 
government stands to make net gains in political support through augmented local public 
expenditures, we would expect to find b  > 0. 
However, just including the affiliation indicator may not effectively identify the effect 
of partisanship because what may really matter is the proportion of seats from the state that 
the state ruling party controls in the national legislature. The affiliation indicator may be 
highly correlated with a large proportion of seats in the national legislature, as an affiliated 
state party may piggy-back on the voters’ support of the national ruling party. We would thus 
need to include the variable measuring the proportion of seats from a state in the national 
legislature that is controlled by the state ruling party, as this could be an important measure of 
the state’s political bargaining power. We also interact this variable with the affiliation 
indicator because our model would be consistent with differential effects of the proportion of 
seats in the national legislature held by the state ruling party in affiliated and non-affiliated 
states. In non-affiliated states, the proportion of seats to the national legislature held by the 
state ruling party would simply measure greater political bargaining power and thus be 
expected to have a positive effect on state deficits. However, in affiliated states if the 
proportion of seats held by the state ruling party is large or close to 1, there may be limited or 
                                                 
7 The affiliation indicator is coded as equal to 1 if we are able to establish strict matching in party identity 
between the state and central government, that is, we ignore the role of political affiliation between loosely knit 
coalitions. This is the appropriate test for the model outlined in section II because it is more likely that local 
spending has spillover effects in national elections if voters are able to match party identities. 
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negligible further gains to be had for the central government by extending additional funds for 
local spending programs. Instead, those affiliated states with a smaller proportion of seats 
controlled by the national ruling party may be politically pivotal to gain a majority in the 
national legislature, with greater marginal political benefits from additional public spending. 
We therefore augment specification (1) by including interaction terms between 
affiliation and the proportion of seats (allotted to the state) controlled by the state ruling party 
in the national legislature—SEATSit. We expect that if the center is indeed vulnerable to 
manipulation by rival political parties, g > 0, while a close interpretation of our model would 
lead us to expect f < 0: 
DEFICITit = b AFFILIATIONit + f AFFIL*SEATSit  + g (1-AFFIL)*SEATSit    
+ h Zit + ai + d t +  e it     (2) 
Basic results 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating specifications (1) and (2) using ordinary least 
squares with robust standard errors. State governments that belong to the same political party 
as the central government have significantly higher fiscal deficits. Among affiliated states, 
those that control a small proportion of seats to the national legislature tend to have 
significantly higher deficits than those that control a higher proportion of seats. In fact, if an 
affiliated state government controls all the state’s seats to the national legislature (that is, the 
proportion=1), then it’s net benefit from affiliation becomes negative, since the coefficient on 
the interaction term is greater than the coefficient on the affiliation indicator. Hence, it is 
really those affiliated states where the center receives greater political gains at the margin that 
seem to be particularly favored in terms of being allowed to run higher deficits.  
 
Table 2. Effect of political affiliation on state fiscal deficit 
 (t-statistic in parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same political party) 
18.50 
(1.95) 
69.59 
(2.42) 
Affiliation * Seats  
–73.85 
(–2.44) 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats  
–9.74 
(–0.44) 
Real state income per capita 
0.01 
(1.74) 
0.01 
(1.68) 
Total population 
–0.002 
(–3.01) 
–0.002 
(–2.97) 
 
N=360 
R–sq=0.70 
N=360 
R–sq=0.71 
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; OLS regressions with robust standard errors; dependent 
variable is real fiscal deficit per capita 
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The effect of political affiliation is substantial—from specification (1) it appears that 
affiliated states on average have a fiscal deficit that is 10 percent higher than the average of 
the sample. From specification (2) the fiscal deficit of affiliated states with the average 
proportion of seats in the nationa l legislature is 12 percent higher than the sample average. 
Affiliated states whose ruling parties control less than half the proportion of seats have 
deficits that are more than 17 percent higher than the sample average. Non-affiliated states 
even with larger proportions of state seats in the national legislature do not appear to bargain 
for higher deficits.  
Robustness of the affiliation effect 
There are several potential problems with correctly identifying the effect of political 
affiliation on deficits in specifications (1) and (2), some of which are directly obtained from 
our strict definition of affiliation. First, the affiliation indicator may be correlated with 
instances of coalition governments at the state level when it is difficult to establish a strict 
party match with the central government. Such cases of coalition regimes are usually coded as 
1, that is not-affiliated, in our sample. But coalition politics is likely to have an impact on 
state deficits in its own right, so that the estimate of b  will be confounded with the effect of 
coalition politics. We could argue that to some extent the state fixed-effects, ai, accounts for 
the proclivity of a state to have coalition governments since some Indian states have been 
systematically more stable than others. However, we also include an additional indicator 
variable COALITION it, which equals 1 when there is no clear majority in the state legislature, 
and the executive is formed of a coalition of various political parties. 
Second, the timing of state elections could be correlated both with state deficits and 
with the affiliation indicator, and we therefore also include a specification that controls for the 
state election cycle.8 Third, the equation explaining variations in state deficits may be 
misspecified if it does not control for any dynamic process underlying deficits. Lagged 
deficits may be correlated both with current deficits and affiliation, and hence is also included 
to test the robustness of the affiliation effect.  
We also test whether the effect of political affiliation changed during and after 1990, 
when the ruling party in the central government did not have a clear majority and required the 
support of a loosely knit coalition of political parties. It may be that political bargaining by 
coalition partners in (strictly) unaffiliated states began to surface after 1990, reversing the 
effect of affiliation on state deficits. This would be driven by a process of legislative 
bargaining (not modeled in section 2) where regional political parties may threaten to 
                                                 
8 Although, Khemani (2000) finds no effect of elections on state debt. The election cycle only affects the 
composition of public spending. 
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withdraw support from the ruling party coalition, leading to immediate dissolution of the 
government. 
In Table 3 we include each of these additional variables whose omission may have 
potentially biased the coefficients on affiliation and its interactions in the results reported in 
the previous table. Coalition politics at the state level and the state election cycle are not 
significantly correlated with state deficits, and including them in the regression does not affect 
the size or significance of the coefficients of interest. This result is interesting in its own right 
because it seems to indicate that state- level political variables have no statistically discernable 
effect on deficits, although they might on the composition of spending and revenues (as 
reported by Khemani 2000). Instead, it is the state’s political relation with the center that 
accounts for large variation in its deficit. The results of including an interaction variable for 
the effect of affiliation after 1990 indicates that political bargaining by unaffiliated states did 
not emerge even after the political weakening of single-party strength in the national 
legislature. We tried several specifications to test for the impact of emerging national 
coalition politics but found no significant change in subnational deficits during and after 
1990. 
 
Table 3. Effect of political affiliation on state fiscal deficit 
 (t-statistic in parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same political party) 
78.03 
(2.32) 
56.24 
(2.13) 
Affiliation * Seats 
–82.54 
(–2.54) 
–57.42 
(–2.09) 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats 
–11.69 
(–0.51) 
–1.69 
(–0.09) 
Coalition government 
(=1 if state executive consists of a coalition govt.) 
–10.01 
(–0.60) 
 
State election year 
(=1 in the year preceding a state election) 
–10.60 
(–0.92) 
 
(1- Affiliation) * Years1990-1995 
10.37 
(0.43) 
 
Real fiscal deficit per capita (lag 1) 
 0.33 
(3.58) 
Real fiscal deficit per capita (lag 2) 
 0.13 
(1.54) 
Real state income per capita 
0.01 
(1.68) 
0.002 
(0.45) 
Total population 
–0.002 
(–3.00) 
–0.001 
(–1.88) 
 N=360 
R-sq=0.71 
N=360 
R-sq=0.76 
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; OLS regressions with robust standard errors; dependent 
variable is real fiscal deficit per capita 
 19
Including lagged values of the deficit (in column 2) also does not change the effect of 
affiliation, although the size of the coefficient is reduced by 20 percent.9 
Intergovernmental transfers 
We now turn to the next issue of estimating the effect of intergovernmental transfers 
on subnational deficits. As discussed in section 2, greater dependence of state governments on 
intergovernmental transfers may create conditions for central bailouts of additional state 
deficits because otherwise the center would face large political costs from the state electorate. 
In addition, not including intergovernmental transfers in the previous specifications may have 
biased the coefficient on political affiliation if the affiliation effect on deficits is actually 
driven by its effect on systematic fiscal transfers from the center to the states, and it is really 
the design of these transfers that creates perverse incentives at the state level for higher fiscal 
deficit.  
Khemani (2002) provides evidence that political affiliation between the center and the 
states affects the distribution of intergovernmental transfers in India in much the same way as 
its effect on fiscal deficits. Politically affiliated states receive greater transfers, creating for 
greater dependence on central transfers, and this dependence in its turn may encourage state 
governments to run higher deficits this period in expectation of higher transfers in the next 
period. Several scholars of intergovernment fiscal relations in India have long argued that 
states that receive higher federal transfers run higher deficits because of a purported “gap-
filling” approach to transfers—where greater federal assistance is provided to states whose 
expenditure requirements are perceived to exceed their revenue potential (Rao 1998, 
McCarten, 2001).  
However, we know of no study that actually tests this hypothesis with rigorous 
statistics—the link is made by simply describing the design of transfers and citing low 
revenue generation and high deficits at subnational levels.10 One reason why no one has 
actually estimated the effect of central transfers on state deficits may be because of the 
inherent simultaneity problem—deficits and transfers are determined in equilibrium and it is 
difficult to tease out a causal relation. Unfortunately, we are also not able to address this 
                                                 
9 Including lagged values of the dependent variable in a panel data setting potentially creates for 
inconsistently estimated coefficients on all the variables. A Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
that produces consistent estimates in dynamic panel data settings, using lagged values as instruments has been 
developed in the literature. However, at this time, we have not applied the GMM estimator to ensure that the 
affiliation effect is robust to that as well. 
10 Rajaraman (2000) is an exception, but she tests for the effect of grants to village governments on their 
own revenue generation in one state of India. But her specification does not really control for the endogenous 
determination of both transfers and local fiscal policies. 
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endogeneity in a satisfactory manner, but make a first attempt to do so by estimating the effect 
of transfers using lagged values of transfers as instruments and in reduced form. 
The constitutional assignment of revenue generation powers and expenditure 
responsibilities, and the role of different channels of central transfers to augment state 
resources is discussed at length in various studies (Rao and Singh 2000, and Anand, Bagchi, 
and Sen 2001). In a nutshell, the Indian federation is characterized by vertical fiscal 
imbalance, where the states undertake almost 60 percent of government expenditures, of 
which about 30 percent is financed by transfers from the central government (Rao and Singh 
2001). There are two channels of general purpose transfers from the center to the states: tax 
sharing and grants decided by a statutory body, the Finance Commission, on the basis of well-
established rules; and grants and loans decided by a semi- independent body, the Planning 
Commission, which is also based on an established formula.11 
The results for intergovernmental transfers are reported in Table 4. The first column 
reports the reduced form with lagged values of Finance Commission transfers (share in taxes 
and statutory grants) and lagged values of Planning Commission grants, and the second 
column with predicted values using the lagged values as instruments. The third column 
reports the effect of the proportion of central transfers in total state revenues as a measure of 
state dependence. We find that contrary to the widespread opinion that the design of 
intergovernment transfers in India provides states with perverse incentives for fiscal 
management, greater transfers are actually correlated with lower deficits. The effect of 
affiliation is unchanged even after controlling for these transfers.12  
 
                                                 
11 Various central ministries also make special purpose transfers for specific schemes and projects. These 
transfers are accompanied by strict conditionalities on the use of funds, and hence are excluded from this 
analysis, as they do not qualify as general budgetary transfers that increase resources available to state 
governments to use at their discretion. 
12 We also estimate the effect of transfers on own revenue generation and do find a significant negative 
effect, but the effect is very small with the elasticity being less than 1 at the sample average. These results are 
available upon request. 
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Table 4. Comparing effect of fiscal transfers versus political affiliation on state fiscal 
deficit 
 (t-statistic in parenthesis) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same 
political party) 
74.06 
(2.50) 
67.02 
(1.99) 
68.15 
(2.41) 
Affiliation * Seats 
–84.88 
(–2.74) 
–78.25 
(–2.21) 
–72.24 
(–2.43) 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats 
–18.39 
(–0.77) 
–15.22 
(–0.62) 
–10.19 
(–0.46) 
Planning Commission Grants (lag 1) 
–0.34 
(–1.53) 
  
Planning Commission Grants (lag 2) 
–0.14 
(–0.69) 
  
Finance Commission Transfers (lag 1) 
–0.34 
(–1.53) 
  
Finance Commission Transfers (lag 2) 
0.14 
(0.55) 
  
Planning Commission Grants 
 –0.51 
(–2.42) 
 
Finance Commission Transfers 
 –0.42 
(–1.73) 
 
Proportion of central transfers in states’ own 
revenues 
  –62.59 
(–0.32) 
Real state income per capita 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.0002 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(1.44) 
Total population 
–0.003 
(–3.16) 
–0.002 
(–2.53) 
–0.002 
(–2.32) 
 N=315 
R-sq=0.73 
N=312 
R-sq=0.72 
N=360 
R-sq=0.71 
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; In column (1), OLS regression with robust standard 
errors; in column (2) 2SLS regression with lagged values of transfers as instruments; dependent variable is 
real fiscal deficit per capita 
Financing the deficit 
It is also important to analyze how the higher deficit of affiliated states is financed. 
Perhaps affiliated state governments have higher credit worth and are more likely to raise and 
repay debt? This seems hardly credible since most of the financing of the deficit of state 
governments is through loans from the central government itself, with heavy regulation of 
market borrowing. However, it is widely believed that these regulations are easy to 
circumvent (Anand, Bagchi, and Sen 2001 and McCarten 2001) and at least in theory the 
Indian federation is susceptible to the risk of soft budget constraints at subnational levels. In 
fact, if the affiliation effect is driven by influential state leaders holding the central 
government hostage, we should probably expect to see the higher deficit financed by market 
loans that circumvent the center. In fact, as we report in Table 5, the higher deficit of 
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affiliated states seems to be entirely financed by higher loans from the central government. 
Hence our interpretation of these results as the central government distributing deficits across 
states in much the same way as other federal transfers in accordance with its political 
objectives.  
The above analysis also suggests that the additional deficits of politically affiliated 
states may not be the result of costly fiscal bargaining between the center and the state, as 
assumed in the strategic game laid out in section 2 with first mover advantages for provincial 
governments. The additional deficits of affiliated states may in fact be the outcome of 
centrally determined regional resource allocation through grants and loans, where political 
considerations result in greater resource allocation to affiliated states. Khemani (2002) 
develops a model of central resource allocation where the solution is characterized by greater 
central transfers to affiliated states.  
 
Table 5. Financing the deficit: Effect of political affiliation on loans from the central 
government 
 (t-statistic in parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same political party) 
16.79 
(2.07) 
76.90 
(2.62) 
Affiliation * Seats 
 –71.89 
(–2.11) 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats 
 17.69 
(1.13) 
Real state income per capita 
0.03 
(3.68) 
0.03 
(3.69) 
Total population 
–0.001 
(–1.39) 
–0.001 
(–1.35) 
 N=360 
R-sq=0.52 
N=360 
R-sq=0.54 
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; OLS regressions with robust standard errors; dependent 
variable is net loans from the central government to the state. 
However, a question still arises: why does the effect of political affiliation on resource 
transfer to state governments work through deficits financed by central loans rather than 
solely through the systematic channels of intergovernmental grants? The answer probably lies 
in additional political discretion and control over loans to state governments, since other 
channels of resource transfers are more rules-based and controlled by statutory bodies. 
Khemani (2002) contrasts the effect of political variables on different channels of transfers 
and shows that the transfers determined by some agencies are more amenable to control by 
the national political executive. The major part of central loans to state governments are in 
fact determined by direct participation of the national political executive in the decision-
making process. 
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Political bargaining through extra-budgetary transactions? 
The analysis undertaken here is based on budgetary transactions of state governments 
for which detailed data is compiled by government agencies on a regular basis. There is 
concern among policy circles that political factors may in fact have a more powerful influence 
on extra-budgetary transactions that are not subjected to legislative scrutiny. One channel of 
particular concern is the debt of state-owned public sector enterprises (PSEs), particularly in 
the power sector, that is guaranteed by the state government and owed either to a nationalized 
banking sector or to other central government agencies. It is therefore possible that non-
affiliated states are able to extract greater resources from the central government through the 
borrowings of their public enterprises that are, in effect, never paid back.  
We do not have state level data available on public sector enterprises to check this 
alternate story of political bargaining between the center and the states. However, one variable 
we do have data for that would perhaps approximate the borrowing of PSEs is that of loans 
and advances by the state government which are reported to consist largely of loans to 
publicly owned enterprises. We find that the effect of political affiliation on such loans and 
advances by the state government is of similar sign and magnitude as the effect on overall 
fiscal deficit. Net loans by affiliated state governments is about 9 percent higher than that by 
non-affiliated state governments, as reported in Table 6. This evidence, and the fact that we 
do not find any effect of political affiliation on the market debt for which data is available 
through state budgets, and that we do indeed find substantial political effects on other 
budgetary transactions (thereby suggesting that legislative scrutiny does not prevent political 
manipulations from taking place), leads us to speculate that any marginal effect of political 
affiliation on the finances of state owned enterprises would be similar to the effects described 
here. 
 
Table 6. Effect of political affiliation on loans and advances by the state government 
 (t-statistic in parenthesis) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same political party) 
5.55 
(0.89) 
36.47 
(2.27) 
Affiliation * Seats 
 –49.20 
(–2.86) 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats 
 –14.64 
(–1.16) 
Real state income per capita 
–0.01 
(1.58) 
–0.01 
(–1.73) 
Total population 
–0.001 
(–1.40) 
–0.001 
(–1.34) 
 N=360 
R–sq=0.61 
N=360 
R–sq=0.62 
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; OLS regressions with robust standard errors; dependent 
variable is net loans and advances made by the state government. 
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Effect on subnational spending 
What is the underlying structural model that leads to greater deficits for affiliated 
states? Following Alt and Lowry (1994) and Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (2000) we 
estimate structural equations for state revenues and expenditure using three stage least 
squares: 
REVENUEit = h1 INCOMEit + h2POPUit  + h3REVENUEit-1 + h4TRANSFERit-1 
+ h5DEFICITit-1 + br AFFILIATIONit + f r  AFFIL*SEATSit  + g r  (1-AFFIL)*SEATSit   
+ lr COALITIONit + ari + drt +  erit    (3) 
 
 
SPENDINGit = m1 REVENUEit + m2POPUit  + m3GROWTHit + m4TRANSFERit-1 
+ m5DEFICITit-1 + bS AFFILIATIONit + f S  AFFIL*SEATSit  + g S  (1-AFFIL)*SEATSit   
+ lS COALITIONit + aSi + dSt +  eSit    (4) 
where REVENUEit is the total per capita revenues of state i in year t, and SPENDINGit is total 
spending undertaken by state i in year t (net of interest payments and loans and advances by 
the state government). 
The estimated parameters for the equations above are reported in Table 7. The pattern 
of coefficients is consistent with those in the deficit regressions in previous tables. Spending 
by affiliated state governments is 5 percent higher on average, although those affiliated 
governments that control a higher proportion of the state’s seats in the national legislature 
have lower spending. Interestingly, states ruled by coalition governments lower spending by 4 
percent. Grants from the central government have a negative effect on state spending, once 
total revenues are controlled for, again contrary to the widely hypothesized view that the 
structure of intergovernment grants creates perverse incentives for greater spending and 
higher deficits. 
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Table 7. Structural Equations for Revenues and Spending of State Governments  
 (z-statistic in parenthesis) 
Variable Revenues Spending 
Real state income per capita 
0.053 
(5.39) 
 
Revenues 
 1.03 
(16.26) 
Growth 
 –0.12 
(–0.29) 
Total population 
–0.01 
(–4.30) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
Revenues (lag 1) 
0.36 
(6.99) 
 
Planning Commission Grants (lag 1) 
–0.02 
(–0.11) 
–0.41 
(–3.14) 
Finance Commission Transfers (lag 1) 
–0.49 
(–2.64) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Deficit (lag 1) 
0.02 
(0.29) 
0.27 
(5.02) 
Political affiliation 
(=1 if center and state govt. belong to same political party) 
2.70 
(0.09) 
40.86 
(2.01) 
Affiliation * Seats 
–21.84 
(–0.69) 
–44.67 
(–2.04) 
(1- Affiliation) * Seats 
–0.16 
(–0.01) 
3.78 
(0.18) 
Coalition government 
(=1 if state executive consists of a coalition govt.) 
–25.74 
(–1.25) 
–31.59 
(–2.18) 
 
N=332 
R-sq=0.94 
N=332 
R-sq=0.98 
Note: State fixed effects and year effects included; 3SLS regression. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper conducts a simple test of the common-pool game in a federation where 
subnational governments are more likely to have higher deficits because they do not 
internalize the macroeconomic effects of fiscal profligacy. Specifically, we test two 
predictions implied by this model that subnational governments that belong to the same 
political party as the central government should have lower fiscal deficits because they are 
more likely to internalize the effect of increasing deficits; and that states that are more 
dependent on intergovernmental transfers should have higher fiscal deficits because of the 
greater disconnect between revenues and spending. We find that in 15 major states of India 
over the period 1972-95, states in fact have substantially higher deficits (about 10 percent of 
the sample average) when their government belongs to the same party governing at the center. 
The additional deficit of affiliated states is financed almost entirely by additional loans from 
the central government (as opposed to the market) leading to our interpretation that political 
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considerations influence the distribution of deficits across states in a similar manner to other 
fiscal transfers. 
In order to explicitly test for the relative importance of the design of 
intergovernmental grants versus political variables, we estimate (for the first time in the 
literature, to the best of our knowledge) the effect of different categories of grants on state 
deficits in India. We find no evidence for the widely held view that the design of 
intergovernment transfers in India provides perverse incentives to state governments to run 
higher deficits. There is no substantial effect of transfers on deficits (in fact a small and 
counter- intuitive negative effect), and a robust effect of political affiliation on deficits that 
holds for a range of specifications. The evidence provided here thus suggests that subnational 
deficits are determined by the nature of electoral competition between political parties, and as 
long as the rules of fiscal federalism do not change the nature of party competition in the 
federation, they may have limited independent effect on the consolidated government deficit.  
The policy implication is that formal rules regulating fiscal relations in federations 
have limited ability for substantial impact on government deficits if political incentives allow 
and encourage circumventing these rules. Further research into the role of political institutions 
and electoral rules may provide insight into whether these institutions can be changed to 
provide better incentives for fiscal prudence, or how other institutional rules can be designed 
to be impervious to political compulsions. A comparative analysis of political determinants of 
budget deficits in developing countries, at both the national and subnational levels, would be 
valuable in underpinning discussions of potential institutional reforms that both encourage 
governments to be fiscally responsible and are resistant to political manipulation. 
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